1. Introduction {#s0005}
===============

In December 31, 2019, the epidemic of novel human coronavirus (COVID-19) was first detected in Wuhan city, Hubei province, China, which has caused pneumonia by Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2). The World Health Organization (WHO) has reported that the main route to spread of the COVID-19 virus is human-to-human transmission. The WHO confirmed that the global pandemic situation for SARS-CoV-2 with 3.5 million confirmed cases and 250,000 deaths until May 7, 2020. COVID-19 has a very contagious nature and rapidly spreads to all developed and developing countries ([@bb0010]; [@bb0015]; [@bb0065]; [@bb0110]; [@bb0095]; [@bb0080]). In Islamic Republic (IR) of Iran, on February 19, 2020, the Ministry of Health and Medical Education official announcement reported the first death caused by COVID-19 ([@bb0100]; [@bb0025]). According to WHO situation report-108 on coronavirus disease (COVID-19) outbreak, on May 7, 2020, Iran was reported to have 103,330 and 6496 total confirmed cases and total deaths, respectively, which was the highest ranking among Eastern Mediterranean countries ([@bb0010]). The very high prevalence of COVID-19 in the world has triggered rigorous investigations to determine the clinical characteristics and severity of the novel coronavirus disease and its potential transmission route including airborne transmission. Although the previous studies and WHO guidelines reported that the main route of spreading novel coronavirus disease is human to human transmission (prolonged and unprotected exposure), there is a much debate about other routes of transmission such as airborne transmission ([@bb0040]; [@bb0105]; [@bb0095]; [@bb0015]; [@bb0055]; [@bb0035]; [@bb0075]; [@bb0080]). Concerning the transmission and epidemiology of the two zoonotic coronaviruses including Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS-CoV) and SARS-CoV-1, it is reported that airborne transmission plays a key role in the coronaviruses disease transmission ([@bb0075]; [@bb0105]).

Given the limited and inconclusive findings about the airborne transmission of SARS-CoV-2, researchers are encouraged to implement more studies in this area. In order to better understand and manage the pandemic SARS-CoV-2 and protect the health-care personnel and public health, it is very important to determine the potential airborne transmission of SARS-CoV-2 as one of the most important debate between researchers and scientific community of pandemic COVID-19 outbreak. Therefore, we tried to examine the air samples of indoor air quality of hospital wards allotted for patients\' treatment with confirmed positive test of COVID-19 to detect potential SARS-CoV-2 transmission.

2. Materials and methods {#s0010}
========================

2.1. Site description and air sampling procedure {#s0015}
------------------------------------------------

The present study was carried out on May 7, 2020, in Shahid Mustafa Khomeini Hospital wards in Ilam province, East of Iran, assigned for patients\' treatment with confirmed COVID-19. Ilam, with 580,000 population, was then reported to have 576 and 54 confirmed COVID-19 cases and deaths, respectively. All of the suspected and confirmed cases of COVID-19 in the other cities were transferred to Shahid Mustafa Khomeini Hospital. The quality of indoor air was checked to see if airborne SARS-CoV-2 existed in the following wards of the hospital complex: intensive care units (ICU) 1 & 2, ICU entrance hall, hospital entrance hall, laboratory ward, CT scan, radiology, men internal ward, woman internal ward and emergency ward. [Fig. 1](#f0005){ref-type="fig"} shows the location of air samples taken from the different points in the indoor air of Hospital.Fig. 1The locations of air samples (![](fx1_lrg.gif)) and confirmed COVID-19 patients\' beds (![](fx2_lrg.gif)) for detection of SARS-COV-2.Fig. 1

There are different types of bio-aerosol sampling including passive and active sampling. In the present study, the liquid impinger biosampler (liquid-phase sampler, SKC biosampler) was consumed as a highly efficient technique to capture airborne viruses in bio-aerosol sampling of the COVID-19 virus in the different wards of the hospital. The impinger biosampler was calibrated for a flow rate of 12 L.min^−1^ at a height of 1.5 m above ground floor to stimulate the breathing zone of people and at least 2 m away from the patient beds ([@bb0050]). The experimental setup compromised from a vacuum pump, connecting tubes, rechargeable battery and the standard impinger biosampler. Fifteen mL of impingement medium, comprise of 13.38 g.L^−1^ of Dulbecco\'s Modified Eagle\'s Medium powder (DMEM), 1.50 g.L^−1^ Na HCO~3~, 2 g.L^−1^ bovine serum albumin with 100 μg.mL^−1^ streptomycin, 100 U.mL^−1^ penicillin and 970 mL distilled water was used for 3 h pumping. The collected samples immediately were transferred to a clinical virology laboratory for SARS-COV-2 detection. According to the protocol of Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) (May 13, [@bb0005]), the sterilization with autoclaves was applied for impinger biosampler and other parts of the experimental setups were disinfected using an ethanol 70% before each bioaerosols sampling in the hospital. The meteorological conditions including temperature (°C), and relative humidity (%) were recorded and monitored using a portable weather station (Kimo). The indoor CO~2~ concentration was also monitored using a portable Aeroqual series 500 (New Zealand). An aerosol spectrometer (Grimm Aerosol Technik GmbH, Germany) was used to monitor particulate matter in the indoor air samples at each sampling locations ([@bb0020]; [@bb0050]). The aerosol spectrometer was monitored at various size fractions between 0.25 and 32 μm during 3 min in each sampling location and we extracted the PM~1~, PM~2.5~, PM~10~ and inhalable particle concentrations.

2.2. SARS-CoV-2 virus detection in air samples using real time reverse transcription--polymerase chain reaction (real time RT-PCR) assay {#s0020}
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

After air sampling, the samples were transferred to the laboratory in an insulated box with cool packs (with 4 °C). The specific primer and probe real-time reverse transcriptase- polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) targeting ORF1ab and N genes (Nucleoprotein gene) were applied to detection of viral genomes of the SARS-CoV-2 virus in the air samples of the hospital indoor air samples. Before RT-PCR, the viral RNA was extracted from the air sample impingement medium, using a GeneAll Ribospin™ (GeneAll, Seoul, KOREA) and stored in −20 degrees C at the time of testing process. PCR amplification was carried out by Sansure Biotech Inc. kit (Changsha, China) according to manufacturer instruction. The results were considered negative when the cycle\'s threshold values reached higher than 40 cycles.

We added 30 μL Master Mix into each well, and then added 20 μL of the extracted viral RNA to the well containing reagent mix. PCR tubes were placed within the Mic Real-Time PCR System (Bio Molecular Systems, Australia). The RT-PCR test was completed in around 124 min and we checked the fluorescent curves to analyze results for S-shape amplification curves and CT values. Positive results with a CT value of less than 40 indicated the presence of SARS-CoV-2 RNA. The Cycle threshold (CT) values were around 38 and 35 for ORF1ab and nucleoprotein gene, respectively.

The LoD of the kit is 200 copies/mL. Controls Materials 2019-nCoV-PCR-Negative Control: A "no template" (negative) control was used to monitor whether there was any contamination for the rRT-PCR process in each detection run.

Controls Materials 2019-nCoV-PCR-Positive Control: A positive template control was used to monitor whether the rRT-PCR process worked properly in each detection run. An internal control in extraction step was applied by Wuhan CoV E-gene kit (TIB Molbiol, Berlin, Germany), to ensure the extraction and PCR amplification process.

2.3. Quality controls for air sampling and the virus detection {#s0025}
--------------------------------------------------------------

All equipment and materials used for this study were disposable, sterile and RNAse/ DNAse free.

As mentioned above, positive, negative, and internal controls were used as process quality control/or/assurance protocol. Routinely, before each sampling project, we collected samples from process ingredients and raw materials and a blank air sample using Impinger/Bubble in different places or under closed laminar flow cabinet after sterilization to make sure the procedures were not contaminated.

3. Results and discussion {#s0030}
=========================

The novel human coronavirus (COVID-19) has recently emerged and rapidly spread through all developed and developing countries and caused a pandemic with great health burden worldwide. In the present study, we examined the hospital indoor viral air quality to determine the potential of airborne transmission of SARS-CoV-2. In this regards, [Table 1](#t0005){ref-type="table"} and [Table 2](#t0010){ref-type="table"} provide precise information about environmental conditions of the hospital wards and the particulate matter concentrations with different aerodynamic diameters during the bioaerosols sampling, respectively. [Table 3](#t0015){ref-type="table"} demonstrates the characteristics of the air samplings (Bioaerosols) for SARS-CoV-2 detection in the indoor air of hospital wards. As depicted in [Table 3](#t0015){ref-type="table"}, there were 183 patients confirmed with COVID-19 with different conditions from severe and critical to mild circumstances. Of the total 14 air samples taken from different points in the hospital wards, two air samples were positive in terms of SARS-CoV-2presence. Our results are opposed to the results of a study by [@bb0025], who did not report any positive samples at *Imam* Khomeini Hospital complex in Tehran. Additionally, our results are also in contrast with the recent published report by WHO (<https://www.who.int/news-room/commentaries/detail/modes-of-transmission-of-virus-causing-covid-19-implications-for-ipc-precaution-recommendations>) and [@bb0085] who reported that airborne transmission is not the transmission route for SARS-CoV-2 to drive the pandemic. [@bb0085] suggest that environment, due to the significant contamination caused by respiratory droplets and fecal shedding of patients with confirmed COVID-19, is the potential medium of transmission ([@bb0085]). In contrast to the above-mentioned reports, the results of the present research supported the findings of a recent preprint paper published by [@bb0090]. [@bb0090] reported the presence of the viral RNA in the air samples of eleven samples (nine samples in the Nebraska Biocontaminant Unit and two samples in the National Quarantine Unit) isolation rooms and in the hallway spaces at University of Nebraska Medical Center. The mean concentration of 2.86 copies/L of air in air samples in the room\'s samples was positive; this in fact revealed the capability of aerosol transportation in the rooms. Finally, authors suggest that due to the low concentration of recovered virus in the samples, it is difficult to find the infectious virus in the samples ([@bb0090]). Their study suffered from a minor limitation: the distance of air samplers from the patient beds was not considered which could affect the interpretation of the reported results ([@bb0090]). In another experimental study, [@bb0105] reported about the possibility of aerosol transmission of SARS-CoV-2 in their experiments using a laboratory nebulized ([@bb0105]). The authors applied a Collison nebulizer to generate aerosol and demonstrated that the viable SARS-CoV-2 virus could be capable in the aerosol for 3 h after nebulization ([@bb0105]). The Collison nebulizer is widely applied to generate fine aerosols from liquid a supply and the type and viscosity of nebulized fluid could affect the size distribution of generated aerosols ([@bb0070]). These results and the rapid spreading of the virus in the world reinforce that the possibility of air transmission of SARS-CoV-2 virus, as well. However, the main routes of preventing and limiting the exposure to COVID-19 recommended by WHO are hand washing and observing social distance ([@bb0010]; [@bb0075]). These measures could not prevent people infection through inhalation of small droplets and aerosols emission by a COVID-19 patients (in many cases they are asymptomatic) that can travel distance of meters or 10 of meters in the air and transmit the viable virus of SARS-CoV-2. On the other hand, the virus can be viable in the aerosols about 3 h ([@bb0075]; [@bb0105]). Moreover, cough mechanism could generate large carrier droplets in the air and considering the size distribution of droplets, larger droplets with viral content deposited close to the emission point and in contrast smaller droplets can be transmitted several meters further in the indoor air (potential aerosol transmission) ([@bb0025]; [@bb0075]; [@bb0045]). In another similar study, about aerodynamic characteristics and RNA concentration of SARS-CoV-2 aerosol in Wuhan hospitals during COVID-19 outbreak, [@bb0060] confirmed that the resuspension process of the virus aerosol, which deposit on protective apparel or floor surface, could be a potential transmission route. Hence, application of efficient sanitization procedures is critical to minimize aerosol transmission of SARS-CoV-2. In another study, [@bb0030] reported about five nurses infected with SARS-CoV-2 during patient care in Shahid Mustafa Khomeini Hospital which is a good agreement with the results of the present experiment.Table 1The environmental conditions of the confirmed COVID-19 patient rooms in the hospital wards.Table 1Air sample no.Hospital wardStatus of door and windowTemperature (°C)Relative humidity (%)CO~2~ concentration (ppm)Ventilation system1ICU1 D/ 3 W2445362Mechanical2ICU1 D/ 3 W2440362Mechanical3ICU1 D/ 3 W2545390Mechanical4ICU1 D/ 3 W2445385Mechanical5ICU1 D/ 0 W2445372Mechanical6ICU 21 D/ 0 W2550377Not applicable7ICU entrance hall1 D/ 0 W2640357Air conditioner + natural8Hospital entrance hall1 D/ 0 W2740341Natural9Laboratory ward1 D/ 2 W2545358Natural10CT scan1 D/ 0 W2545375Natural11Radiology1 D/ 0 W2545383Natural12Men internal ward1 D/ 0 W2650377Natural13Woman internal ward1 D/ 0 W2650360Natural14Emergency ward1 D/ 0 W2750354Natural[^1]Table 2The particulate matter concentrations with different aerodynamic diameter during the air sampling in the hospital wards.Table 2Sample no.Hospital wardPM~1~ (μg/m^3^)PM~2.5~ (μg/m^3^)PM~10~ (μg/m^3^)Inhalable particle (μg/m^3^)1ICU8.1512.4822.9324.952ICU9.0313.3028.0737.033ICU9.6313.9324.9729.174ICU8.912.926.7730.875ICU9.2713.0023.1325.086ICU10.5716.2341.3756.877ICU entrance hall11.9317.4037.1743.078Hospital entrance hall12.3318.2337.848.7Table 3location of air sampling points in Shahid Mustafa Khomeini hospital wards for detection of SARS-CoV-2.Table 3Air sample no.Hospital wardNumber of health-care workerNo. of patientsStatus of COVID-19 patientsPresence of SARS-CoV-2 in air sample1ICU6 people in the hospital in each shift10Severe[a](#tf0005){ref-type="table-fn"}, critical[a](#tf0005){ref-type="table-fn"}[**Positive**]{.ul}2ICU6 people in the hospital in each shift10Severe, criticalNegative3ICU6 people in the hospital in each shift10Severe, critical[**Positive**]{.ul}4ICU6 people in the hospital in each shift10Severe, criticalNegative5ICU6 people in the hospital in each shift10Severe, criticalNegative6ICU 2Empty0EmptyNegative7ICU Entrance hallEmptyNot applicable[d](#tf1000){ref-type="table-fn"}EmptyNegative8Hospital entrance hallNot applicableNot applicableNot applicableNegative9Laboratory ward2 people in the hospital in each shiftAbout 30 per daySuspected, confirmedNegative10CT scan1 people in the hospital in each shiftAbout 20 per daySuspected, confirmedNegative11Radiology1 people in the hospital in each shiftAbout 15 per daySuspected[b](#tf0010){ref-type="table-fn"}, confirmedNegative12Men internal ward6 people in the hospital in each shift25Confirmed and mild[c](#tf0015){ref-type="table-fn"}Negative13Woman internal ward6 people in the hospital in each shift25Confirmed and mildNegative14Emergency ward6 people in the hospital in each shift18SuspectedNegative[^2][^3][^4][^5][^6]

Thus, according to the results of above-mentioned studies, hospital indoor air could be a potential source for transmission of viable SARS-CoV-2 virus as we identified two positive cases out of fourteen air samples in the indoors of hospital air ([@bb0060]; [@bb0045]; [@bb0075]). Although, different routes with unknown mode of generation of airborne SARS-CoV-2 such as coughing, speaking, sneezing and normal breathing are involved in the carrier aerosols from a patient\'s respiratory systems ([@bb0025]). We suggest that more research is required to determine the mode of aerosols generation that contain airborne SARS-CoV-2 from different routes of emissions (coughing, speaking, sneezing and normal breathing) from patients\' respiratory systems. Besides, the results of this study are qualitative (based on the presence and absence of the virus in the air samples), therefore, the quantitative determination of number of viable and total viruses in the aerosol containing airborne SARS-CoV-2 as well as examination in all wards of hospital are extremely important. Finally, due to the potential of airborne transmission of virus in the indoor hospital air, it is very important to take high levels of personal protective equipment (PPE) (Using facemask) for health care workers in the hospitals.

4. Conclusion {#s0035}
=============

To summarize, the rapid global spread of the COVID-19 and its increasing trend in infecting people indicate that there are several pathways to the virus transmission such as airborne pathway in addition to person-to-person transmission. Therefore, we examined the potential aerosol transmission of virus in indoor air of hospital wards with confirmed COVID-19 patients. Accordingly, we found two positive out of 14 air samples, which were taken from different wards of the hospital air. Due to the potential of airborne (aerosol) transmission of virus in the indoor air of hospital and based on national and international evidence, it is very important to take the highest levels of PPE precautions to ensure health security especially for healthcare personnel at hospitals.
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[^1]: **Not applicable**: no hospitalized patients.

[^2]: Not applicable: no hospitalized patients.

[^3]: Patients under intubation.

[^4]: No intubation and no oxygen mask.

[^5]: Patients under oxygen mask.

[^6]: Not applicable.
